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Abstract
This chapter links organizational identity as a cohesive attribute to corporate 
strategy and a competitive advantage, using Toyota as a case study. The evolution of 
Toyota from a domestic producer, and exporter, and now a global firm using a novel 
form of lean production follows innovative tools of human resources, supply chain 
collaboration, a network identity to link domestic operations to overseas invest-
ments, and unparalleled commercial investments in technologies that make the firm 
moving from a sustainable competitive position to one of unassailable advantage 
in the global auto sector. The chapter traces the strategic moves to strength Toyota’s 
identity at all levels, including in its overseas operations, to build a global ecosystem 
model of collaboration.
Keywords: institutional identity, lean management, learning symmetries, docility, 
habits of attention, kaizen
(Article for Lawrence Emeagwali (Ed.), Strategic Management. London, 2018)
October 18, 2018.
“There is no use trying” said Alice, “we cannot believe impossible things.”—Lewis 
Carroll
1. Introduction
Few organizations combine the institutional benefits of longevity and tradi-
tion with the disruptive startup advantages of novelty and suspension of path 
dependent behavior. This chapter provides a case study of Toyota Corporation, an 
organization with an explicit philosophy that embodies “…standardized work and 
kaizen (that) are two sides of the same coin. Standardized work provides a con-
sistent basis for maintaining productivity, quality and safety at high levels. Kaizen 
furnishes the dynamics of continuing improvement and the very human motiva-
tion of encouraging individuals to take part in designing and managing their 
own jobs” ([1], p. 38). Toyota’s philosophy, combining a model that is “stable and 
paranoid, systematic experimental, formal and frank” [2], often called the Toyota 
Way, evolved from the founding of Toyoda Automatic Loom Works, founded in 
1911, setting up an auto division in 1933, and Toyota Motor Company in 1937 [3].
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What is unique about Toyota and its pioneering lean production, described col-
loquially as just-in-time (JIT), embraces a deliberative philosophy that establishes 
a corporate identity for safety, quality, and aspirational performance goals. Going 
forward, with plants and distribution centers around the world, Toyota cultivates 
a direct involvement of employees, suppliers, and other organizations, called the 
Toyota Group, as a network identity that extends boundary members of the firm’s 
eco-system that also embodies detailed performance measures to strengthen and 
reinforce identity enhancement. These identity attributes creating novel and seem-
ingly contradictory configurations, both at home and now in global markets. Toyota 
provides a framework to link identity as a cohesive attribute for problem-solving 
with explicit, data-driven benchmarks, a DNA that encompasses observation, 
analysis, hypothesis testing from the shop floor to the executive suite [3, 4].
The concept of identity has a long pedigree in the social sciences, dating from 
classical writers like Adam Smith, Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim, 
focusing on individual identities separate and distinct from larger social systems 
arising from the division of labor. However, identity in organizations is a relatively 
new construct, based on claims that are “central, distinctive, and enduring” [5]. 
Despite the growing literature on organizational identity [6, 7], there is less con-
sensus given the multiple disciplinary focus, the levels of analysis, well as minimum 
empirical work linking organizational identity to corporate strategy. In some cases, 
identity linkages touch on outcomes like brand equity, reputation, visual media like 
social networking and the gap between defining what the organization is today and 
what it wants to become, despite the high failure rate of firms [8]. Indeed, there is 
little reason to doubt that “the concept of organizational identity is suffering an 
identity crisis” ([9], p. 206).
Despite the growing literature on organization identity, encompassing diverse 
constructs and methodologies [6, 7], often at different organizational levels 
(individuals, groups and senior management), has limited empirical study linking 
individual and group identity both to corporate strategy and corporate perfor-
mance. Various accounts of social experiences, concentrating on a sense of insider 
and outsider to frame a mutual identity mindset that shapes organizational identity, 
apply personal histories and narratives, but leave open the distinction between 
corporate identity and organizational identity [10]. Identity producing mechanisms 
flowing from purposeful actions vary by context, such as universities and faith-
based organizations to technology and engineering organizations with complicated 
role activities grounded in socio-technical design [11]. Compelling cases of identity 
as a tool for organizational integration, or the impact of cleavage and conflict owing 
to human diversity policies, personality characteristics of key actors, and sub-unit 
identity images advance understanding of behavior within organizations, but 
often ignores how both strategic choice and external forces impact these internal 
mindsets. Many scholars associate internal identity issues to external stakeholders 
using sundry communication tools (e.g., [12]) but the literature has few studies that 
explain what organizational identity features are truly different and give a competi-
tive advantage in contested markets over time. To advance hypothesis testing and 
to encourage conceptual development in both theory and practice, there must be a 
linkage to identity as a construct that provides insights to an organization’s competi-
tive advantage.
This chapter addresses the issues linking strategic choices and capabilities to 
Toyota’s identity as a case study. Toyota’s strategic positioning and high-performance 
outcomes amplify identity tools at three levels, its employees (both in Japan and 
its factories overseas), its suppliers, and its customers. Depicted as a best practice 
company [13], Toyota is seen as a model to emulate in sectors as diverse as hospi-
tals and retailing. This chapter has three objectives: first, by examining Toyota’s 
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transformation as a leading domestic producer to a top global company, the firm’s 
core identity has changed little despite numerous internal and external changes; 
second, Toyota as a case study illustrates the capacity to have multiple images in 
different contexts, without sacrificing its core identity; and third, the chapter offers 
recommendations for empirical studies of organizational identity.
2. Organizational identification and identity
In their seminal article, Stuart and Whetten [5] put forward the concept of 
organizational identity constituting a set of “claims” and specified what was cen-
tral, distinctive and enduring, but recognizing that organizations can have multiple 
identities and claims that can be contradictory, ambiguous, or even unrelated. 
While some authors have attempted to provide more clarity, Pratt addresses the 
construct of identity and its generality, stating it was “often overused and under 
specified” beyond general statements about “who are we?” and “who do we want to 
become?”
Historically, identity and identification are described in classical writings 
focusing on societies, social systems, and their constituent parts. Such examples as 
Adam Smith in economics on the division of labor, Babbage on the division of work 
tasks, Marx on division of social class, Max Weber on the division of status and 
occupation, and Durkheim on differentiated social structures, each contributed to 
current views of how individuals, groups, and teams become a cohesive collective in 
a complex organization. More specifically, Durkheim’s [14] analysis of the divi-
sion of labor and differentiated social structures with distinct socio-psychological 
values and impacts required variations in role homogeneity in sub-systems.1 His 
views influenced subsequent writers as diverse as Freud in psychiatry and Harold 
Laswell in political theory, whose study of world politics includes a chapter entitled 
“Nations and Classes: The Symbols of Identification.”
Simon [15] introduced identification to organization theory, describing it as fol-
lows: “the process of identification permits the broad organizational arrangements 
to govern the decisions of the persons who participate in the structure” (p. 102). 
More specifically, “a person identifies himself with a group when, in making a deci-
sion, he evaluates the several alternatives of choice in terms of their consequences 
for the specified group” in contrast to personal motivation, where “his evaluation 
is based upon an identification with himself or his family” ([16], p. 206). Both the 
fault lines of identity, based on status, perverse incentives, class or occupation, as 
well as group identification [17] impact organizational performance by variations 
in shared goals and preferences, as well as forms of interaction and feedback, often 
enhanced or lessoned by recruitment patterns and work rules and incentives.
Identity and identification as reference points in organizations also flow from 
the configuration of roles, role structures, and “clusters of activities” where “a 
person has an occupational self-identity and is motivated to behave in ways which 
affirm and enhance the value attributes of that identity” ([18], p. 179). Theories 
of social identity assume individual identity is partitioned into ingroups and 
outgroups is social situations and organizational life, often with an implicit cost–
benefit calculation, but acts of altruistic behavior, where behavioral norms benefit 
the welfare of others, often seen in “collectivist societies,” strengthens organi-
zational identity [19]. Other approaches take a social constructionist approach, 
1 To quote Durkeim [14] directly, “…as we advance in the evolutionary scale, the ties which bind the indi-
vidual to his family, to his native soil, to traditions which the past has given to him, to collective group 
images, become loose…’ (p. 259).
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emphasizing social and cultural perspectives [20], where sense-making comes 
from stories and narratives of everyday experience [21], thereby, “…in linking iden-
tity and narrative in an individual, we link an individual [career] story to a particu-
lar cultural and historical narrative of a group” [22]. Going further, Dutton et al. 
[23] speculate that organizational identification is a process of self-categorization 
cultivated by distinctive, central, and enduring attributes that get reflected in 
corporate image, reputation, or strategic vision. Alvesson [24] describes the need 
for identity alignment: “…by strengthening the organization’s identity—its experi-
enced distinctiveness, consistency, and stability—it can be assumed that individual 
identities and identification will be strengthen with what they are supposed to be 
doing at their work place.”
While some studies [25] purport to focus on managerial strategies that project 
images as a tool to shape distinctive identities with stakeholders, the reality is 
that organizational identities without corresponding integration of individual, 
sub-unit, or group identification may lead to behavioral frictions, and detach-
ment via lower compliance and cues of detachment. Conflict and cleavages affect 
group-binding identification, often persisting as conformity of opinion, forms of 
social interaction, and group loyalties, as well as enhancing internal legitimacy 
for desired outcomes. While both individuals and groups may have multiple and 
loosely connected identities, there remains lingering organizations dysfunctions 
that exacerbate cleavage and conflict, such as hypocrisy, selective amnesia, or 
disloyalty [18]. Psychological exit comes from unsatisfactory outcomes, a form 
of weakening organizational identity and strengthening group identity to give 
voice for remedial actions [26]. In the extreme, such sub-identities found in 
groups and sub-units compete with other forms of identification and may lead to 
organizational dysfunctions [17].
Akerlof and Kranton [27] view organizational identity, with emphasis on why 
firms must transform workers from outsiders to insiders, as a form of motivational 
capital. In short, a distinctive identity is a distinctive competence. To quote Likert 
[28]. “the favorable attitudes towards the organization and the work are not those 
of easy complacency but are the attitudes of identification with the organization 
and its objectives and a high sense of involvement in achieving them” (p. 98). Other 
theorists suggest variations in organizational identity impact sense-making and 
interpretative processes [29], internalization of learning [10] and processes linking 
shared values and modes of performance [30].
Identity and identification cues, viewed as the mental perceptions of individual 
self-awareness, social interactions and experiences, and self-esteem have many 
antecedents, such as social class [31], demographic factors like age, race, religion, 
or sex [32], and national culture and identity [33]. Studies emphasizing social 
construction perspectives stem from individual accounts, often defined in social 
narratives, histories, and biographies rooted in time and place [34]. As Hammack 
[22] emphasizes, “…in linking identity and narrative in an individual, we link an 
individual story to a particular cultural and historical narrative of a group” (p. 230). 
At a general level, organizational culture depicts the set of norms and values that 
are widely shared and strongly held throughout the organization [35], and refers 
to the “unspoken code of communication among members of an organization” 
[36] and aids and supplements task coordination and group identity. In this way, 
individual employees better understand the premises of decision choices in problem 
solving at the organizational level. In complex organizations, identity is linked to 
the strategic capacity of choice opportunities and implementation dynamics of 
priorities and preferences. As Thoenig and Paradieise [37] emphasize, “strategic 
capacity lies to a great extent in how much its internal subunits … shape its identity, 
define its priorities approve its positions, prepare the way for general agreement to 
5Organizational Identity, Corporate Strategy, and Habits of Attention: A Case Study of Toyota
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.81117
be adopted on its roadmap and provide a framework for the decisions and acts of all 
its components” (p. 299).
Such diverse views leave open how organizational identity, or shared central 
vision, confers competitive advantage in contested spaces. As a starting hypothesis, 
a shared identity strengthens coordination across diverse groups applying common 
norms, codes and protocols, hence improving shared learning skills. In a similar 
vein, individual cleavages and loyalties are lessoned by shared interactions and 
information sharing that mobilize learning tools. Further, organizational identity 
strengthens individual identities via performance success that promotes a shared set 
of preferences, expectation, and habits of rule setting.
3. Organizational performance at Toyota
By any standards—shareholder value, product innovation, employee satisfaction 
measured by low turnover and lack of strike action, market capitalization—Toyota 
has been astonishingly successful, both against rival incumbents in the auto sector, 
but as a organizational pioneer in transportation with just-in-time thinking. Against 
existing rivals at home, or in an industry with firms pursuing growth by alliances 
and acquisition (Renault-Nissan-Mitsubishi, VW-Porsche), facing receivership and 
saved by public funding (GM and Chrysler), exiting as a going concern (British 
Leyland) or new startups (Tesla). Toyota’s performance is unrivaled. Toyota remains 
a firm committed to organic development, steady and consistent market share in all 
key international markets, and cultivating a shared identity within its eco-system 
around measurable outcomes of product safety, quality, and consumer value.
As shown in Figure 1, despite many forms of competitive advantages, such as 
size, high domestic market share, being part of a larger group, or diversification, 
there are many times when the side expected to win actually is less profitable and 
may actually lose. Toyota’s growth and expansion, despite the turbulent 2009 recall 
and temporary retreats [38, 39], comes with consistent profitability and market 
share growth. In this organizational transformation, Toyota has replicated its 
Figure 1. 
Operating Profits versus Firm Revenues in the Auto Sector.
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identity of “safety, quality, and value” outside its home market, often depicted by 
foreigners as “inscrutable,” closed, and Japan Inc. [40]. Strategically, this organiza-
tional identity framework is multipurpose, allowing shared alignment of identities 
with domestic employees, suppliers and supervisors, but also incorporating these 
identity attributes first to foreign operations in North America and subsequently to 
Europe and Asia. Toyota management considers the firm as a learning organization, 
where learning symmetries take place at all levels, vertically and horizontally.
Unlike many corporate design models of multinationals, where foreign subsid-
iaries passively replicate the production systems of the home market (a miniature 
replica effect) or seek out decision-attention from head-quarters [41] Toyota is 
evolving as a global enterprise. In this model, Toyota’s foreign subsidies and trade 
blocks (e.g., NAFTA and Europe), solve key problems and translate the protocols 
for headquarters and its global network of factories, distribution outlets, and ser-
vice and maintenance dealerships. In this way, Toyota’s training protocols, network 
learning systems, and using foreign subsidies to develop new technologies (e.g., 
Toyota Canada pioneering cold weather technologies for ignitions engineering), i.e., 
a learning chain that mobilizes employee identity to network identity, including its 
global supply chain collaboration [42–45].
To illustrate the complexity of contemporary auto production and the need to 
evolve both organizational design around supply chains, and the nature of comple-
mentarities in production, firms like Toyota must realign engineering and techno-
logical systems to novel role configurations for a diverse workforce. A car (or truck) 
has over 5000 parts, components, and sub-assemblies, where factories are linked to 
diverse supply chains with tightly-knit communications and transport linkages, often 
across national boundaries, to produce a factory production cycle of 1 minute per 
vehicle, or even less. Parts or components like steel, for instance, are not commodities, 
undifferentiated only by price, and Japanese steel producers produced the high carbon 
steel that was more resistant to water, hence rust. This production cycle demands very 
high quality and safety of each part and component, plus the precision engineering 
processes to assemble them. This alignment determines not only the standards of qual-
ity and safety of the finished vehicle but the image and reputation of the company, plus 
an indispensable need to retain price value of the brand in the aftermarket sales cycle.
To this contemporary production system, reshaped and refined since Toyota first 
introduced in 1956 what Womack et al. [46] termed “the machine that changed the 
world,” auto production now faces a steady, relentless, and inexorable technology 
disruption. This shift in engines and fuel consumption technologies, away from die-
sel and gasoline-powered vehicles, to new dominant technologies, such as electric 
vehicles, fuel-cells, battery, hydrogen, or hybrid, each requiring massive changes 
to traditional parts and components suppliers, and the layout of factory assembly. 
Successful firms thus require forward-looking strategic intent and novel organiza-
tional configurations both to exploit existing systems based on gasoline vehicles, or 
novel organizational systems to explore new technologies and processes. Strategies 
differ widely. Tesla as a new startup has dedicated factories and labs using lithium 
battery technology. To gain equivalent scale of Toyota, GM, and Volkswagen, i.e., 
over 10 million vehicles per year, Nissan and Renault joined with Mitsubishi as a 
new alliances and equity investment partner.
By contrast, both Ford and GM are retreating from large markets like Europe, 
Japan, or India with direct-foreign investment strategies. Even more intrusive to exist-
ing production programs and protocols are new demands for data analytics, artificial 
intelligence, robotic and associated Internet and social media technologies. Both 
incumbent firms, new startups, and suppliers are developing futuristic technologies in 
drivers’ facial recognition, driving habits, and consumer disabilities, from wheel chairs 
to hearing that impact cars of the future, and impose threats to existing distinctive 
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competences and corporate identity. Not all firms can manage simultaneously the 
processes of exploitation of existing organizational programs, and the exploration of 
product innovation and assembly [47]. Toyota is an exception.
The Toyota production system is transformational, an organizational philosophy 
around two core ideas, kaizen or principles of continuous improvement, and nema-
washi, or consensus decision-making that allow network effects across its global facto-
ries, research labs, its supplier organizations, and related parts of the global eco-system, 
from universities to global shipping firms. In the firm’s century-old evolution, starting 
as a leading textile firm that still exists but migrating to auto manufacturing as only the 
second largest by unit sales (behind Nissan), Toyota has emerged as the top producer 
both at home and globally, measured by market share, and a leading player in markets 
like North America, Europe, Latin America, India and China, where many rivals have a 
low market share presence (e.g., Europe firms in the US, American firms in Europe).
Strategies of corporate retreat in key markets (GM in Europe, GM and Ford in 
India, Ford in Japan), suggest home market advantages are the new testing ground 
for first-mover disadvantage [48] when firms face massive technology disruption. 
To cite an example, during the 1990s, four major automakers, Toyota, GM, Honda, 
and Ford, took the lead in the development of hybrid technologies, with GM the 
leader with 23 patents in hybrid vehicles (vs. 17 for Toyota, 16 for Ford, and 8 for 
Honda). By 2000, however, Honda and Toyota were the clear leaders, with Honda 
had filed 170 patents, and Toyota with 166 in hybrid drivetrain technology, far 
ahead pf Ford with 85 and GM at 56. Today, Fords’ hybrid is a license from Toyota.
4. Toyota identity as a social construct
The auto sector symbolizes the development of post-war multinationals 
largely based on firm-specific capabilities and proprietary advantages. This 
organizational evolution includes changing work mechanisms characterized as 
machine theory by management [49], a catch-all phrase to describe scientific 
management techniques espoused by Frederick Taylor from his 1911 book with 
that title. He first learned time management at Philips Executer Academy and 
became an early practitioner of what became known as kaizen, continuous 
improvement, working with Henry Gantt [50], studying all aspects of work, 
tools, machine speeds, workflow design, the conversion of raw materials into 
finished products, and payment systems. The Taylor studies, later dubbed 
Fordism [51], was an approach to eliminate waste and unnecessary movements, or 
“soldiering”—a deliberate restriction of worker output.
Taylor’s disciples in the engineering profession spread his message beyond 
America, to Europe, as well as to Japan and Russia, where even Lenin and 
Trotsky developed an interest after the Revolution of 1917. In appearances before 
Congressional committees, and in other forums, Taylor’s theories faced withering 
criticisms and great resistance by American union movement a “dehumanizing of 
the worker” and a tool for profits at the expense of the worker. [50, 52]. In Japan, 
however, Taylorism and scientific management had wide acceptance, starting with 
Yukinori Hoshino’s translation of Principles of Scientific Management with the title, 
The Secret of Saving Lost Motion, which sold 2 million copies. Several firms adopted 
scientific management practices, including standard motions, worker bonuses, and 
Japanese authors published best sellers on similar notions of work practices, including 
one entitled Secrets for Eliminating Futile Work and Increasing Production [3].
After 1945 in Japan, given the wartime devastation of Japan’s industrial capac-
ity, resource scarcity—food, building supplies, raw materials of all sorts, electric 
power—had a profound and lasting impact on Japanese society, even more so when 
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the American military supervised the Occupation and displayed abundance of 
everyday goods—big cars, no shortage of food, long leisure hours, and consumer 
spending using American dollars. As Japanese firms slowly rebuilt, the corporate 
ethos promoted efficient use of everything, and waste became a watchword 
for inefficiency. Japanese executives visited US factories, the Japanese media 
documented US success stories. American management practices were widely 
emulated, and US consultants—notably Peter Drucker, W. Juran, and W. Edwards 
Deming—had an immense following and their books, papers and personal appear-
ances were publicized, translated and widely-read, even by high school students. 
While American firms emphasized a marketing philosophy where the customer is 
king, Japanese firms remained committed to production, helped in part by trad-
ing firms, led by the nine giant Soga Sosha, to distribute and sell both at home and 
abroad. US human resource practices also showed a stark contrast with Japanese 
practices. In the US, the rise of the trade union movement and national legislation 
from Roosevelt’s New Deal, meant that management-worker relations for firms and 
factories were contractual, setting out legal norms, and negotiated commitments 
for pay, seniority, promotion, job rotation and skills differentials, so that worker 
identity was less towards the firm, more to the trade union, and what incentives and 
compensation union leadership could deliver [53].
Japan industrial firms, by contrast, cultivated three features of management-
worker relations. The first was life time employment—once hired, the employee 
stayed in the firm until retirement. Second, wages and compensation were deter-
mined by seniority—young workers received lower wages and bonus compensation, 
just as older workers were paid more relative to their actual productivity. And third, 
firms had enterprise unions, as distinct from industry unions in the US and Europe 
(e.g., unions autoworkers, coal workers or shipbuilders). All three characteristics 
greatly extended the psychological linkages between employee identity and the 
firm’s identity, and the employee’s career success was directly tied to the firm’s suc-
cess. In Japan, with very low turnover, but high screening processes, firms hired the 
best graduates, and training was on-going and formed part of the job description, 
with little layoffs, firing, or absenteeism. Additionally, there was little employee 
fear of adopting new technologies. Abegglen and Stalk [54] describe the implication 
of technological diffusion as follows: “…it is the relatively close identification of the 
interests of kaisha and their employees that have made this rate of technological 
change possible and the patterns of union relations implicit in that degree of identi-
fication” (p. 133). Indeed, some writers go further, citing how the human resource 
system was imposed on a Confucian society, with an ethos to govern individual and 
group interactions for reciprocal benefits, in a market system of winners and losers. 
As Morishima [55] puts it, Korea and China chose Confucianism with the market, 
Japan chose the market with Confucianism, while North America and Europe were 
characterized by Protestant-driven market behavior of winners and losers. For 
Toyota, a family enterprise with links to many sectors like steel, textiles, avia-
tion and machinery, the post-war environment brought inevitable contracts with 
American automotive practices.
Okika [56] describes the implications of the evolving Japanese model of labor-
management relations in the firm:
Japanese enterprises made their decisions by gaining an overall consensus through 
repeated discussions starting from the bottom and working up … making it easier 
for workers to accept technical innovation flexibly. For a start, that sense of identity 
with the firm is strong and they are aware that the firm’s development is to their 
own advantage, so they tend to improve the efficiency of its production system and 
strengthens its competitiveness (p. 22).
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Across Japan, industrial firms, from Sony to Canon, recruited workers from 
rural areas, executives read US textbooks, and many visited US factories to study 
management practices. The production focus of Japanese firms, in a competi-
tive environment of limited slack, hence the need for managerial improvisation 
and what the French call bricolage, i.e., making do with what is available [57]. In 
operational terms, this meant long production runs, division of labor taken to 
the extreme is monotonous assembly work tasks, product output determined by 
managerial estimates of demand, and wide use of buffer stocks to absorb varying 
time cycles of different sub-assembly needs. Buffer stocks also allowed conflicting 
management department goals to get sorted out with little time constraints, and less 
need to focus on quality issues based on bad product design, resource waste (e.g., 
steel), or timing processes that lead to product defects. Organizational reforms 
widely adopted across US industry, such as product divisions for large enterprises, 
largely left the product system intact, allowing middle management to focus on 
coordination between operational benchmarks at the factory level and financial 
benchmarks imposed by top management [58]. GM was seen in Japan as the proto-
type models to emulate.
5. Challenges to orthodox industrial production
The advance of industrialization involved new methods of energy, raw materi-
als, dominant technologies, and organizational configurations [58] but relatively 
little to consideration actual production systems, especially after Henry Ford 
introduced mass production using interchangeable parts. As foreign executives 
visited Ford’s assembly lines, there were dissenting opinions, such as Czech entre-
preneur Thomas Bata and S. Toyoda who worked a year in Detroit. How could three 
core concepts be integrated—craft skills of custom-made products like a kimono or 
a house, the volume-cost advantages of mass production, and the nigh utilization 
capacity of process production in beer or chemicals?
Toyota’s introduction of the lean production system has been widely studied,2 
including its the origins in the 1950s by Ohno [62], when visiting America and 
adopting ideas from super market chains, and had strong views on scientific man-
agement’s focus on the total production system, and Japanese concepts of jishu kanri 
(voluntary work groups). Japanese managers had both knowledge and experience 
with traditional crafts sectors like woodblock prints and silk designs in textiles or 
the long training needed for Japan’s culinary arts. How could three core concepts 
be integrated—craft skills of custom-made products like a kimono or a house, the 
volume-cost advantages of mass production, and the nigh utilization capacity of 
process production in beer or chemicals?
Core concepts of lean production is the desire to maximize capacity utilization, 
by reducing production variability and minimize excess inventories with a view 
to eradicating waste [54]. But other factors are critical, such as supplying high 
quality workmanship of craft production, reducing per unit costs via mass produc-
tion using interchangeable parts, and high capacity utilization of continuous flow 
production, typically seen as three distinct systems. The ingrained ethos of resource 
scarcity in Japanese society, demonstrating that low slack in organizations encour-
age search behavior [63], and these requirements required pooling of efforts as an 
organizational philosophy (Figure 2).
2 For more detailed background on Toyota’s production system, see Cusumano [59], Dyer and Nobeoka 
[43], Fujimoto [60], Likert [61], McMillan [3], and Ohno [62].
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To perfect the system over time, starting in the 1960s, Toyota accelerated the 
adoption of high work commitment by organizing workers in teams, reducing the 
number of job classifications, seeking suggestions from employees, and investing 
in training of new workers, 47–48 days per worker, compared to less than 5–6 days 
for US plants, 21–22 days for European plants [3]. The focus on production as an 
integrated system, using hardware ideas like quick die change equipment, robots, 
and advanced computer-aided design, also meant removing traditional tasks that 
are noisy, hard on the eyes, or dangerous to allow employees to concentrate on tasks 
like quality assessment, and allowing a worker to stop the entire production line, 
known as andon, in the case of equipment problems, shortage of parts, and discov-
ery of defects, i.e., transferring certain responsibilities from managers and supervi-
sors to workers [60]. Paradoxically, Toyota and other Japanese auto plants were far 
less automated than their foreign-owned rivals, not just for assembly line work but 
other tasks like welding and painting.
Einstein once said, “Make everything as simple as possible, but no simpler.” 
Simplicity became a watchword in the evolution of Toyota’s lean production sys-
tem, a contrast to the complicated vertical integration model adopted in Detroit. 
Toyota adopted a highly focused structural design, becoming a systems assembler 
and sourcing from dedicated suppliers, each with core competences in specialized 
domains and technologies. Production engineering—e.g., craft, mass assembly or 
process systems—became central features as organizational configuration, choos-
ing from the strengths of each but discarding the perceived weaknesses. Stress 
was place on the worker, avoiding the monotonous routines of a moving assembly 
line, by including job rotation and special training to apply quality management 
circles within a group structure. The advantages of process manufacturing as high 
capacity utilization came from high initial overhead of equipment and overhead, 
including IT investments, but allowing flexibility in machine set up, such as quick 
die change that reduced the need to stop the line for product variability from 
3 months, to 3 weeks, to 3 minutes, to less than 3 seconds. The internal factory 
layout, an S shape configuration, changed the sequencing of tasks, the forms of 
supervisor-employee interactions, and the speed and timing of interdependencies 
between the production operations and external suppliers of parts, delivering 
“just in time.”
Figure 2. 
Contrasts Between Traditional Technical Design and Toyota’s Model.
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In some cases, the interactions involve the core production system and inde-
pendent suppliers serving as complementarities3 where the competitive advantage 
of one is augmented by the presence of the other [45]. Early examples included 
Ford’s cooperation with Firestone to produce tires, or Renault’s links to Michelin to 
produce radial tires. Complementarities allow synergistic advantages, a contrast 
to additive, discrete features [64], and allow two immediate effects: knowledge 
spillovers at differing stages of production, including process learning impacts, and 
complimentary and coordinated changes in activities and programs across the value 
chain, such as process benchmarks for product design, scheduling, inspection, 
and time cycles of production. Toyota cultivates complementarity attributes but 
instituted a revised activity sequence, discarding production based on estimated 
demand forecasts, and turning finished production of cars and trucks to car lots for 
ultimate sale. The pull system starts with customer demands, allowing novel design 
using the advantages of the need for high capacity utilization of smaller actual 
output demands, to manufacture outputs with shorter time for product delivery.
6. JIT and Toyota’s deep supplier collaboration systems
Toyota’s lean production both reconfigures the boundaries of the firm by incorporat-
ing the supply chain as an integrated, cooperative network with collective competences 
and capabilities across the network value chain and incorporates decision processes for 
learning and knowledge sharing that shifts subunit identities to a collective identity. 
Lean production requires these system-wide processes to address inoperability issues 
like buffer stocks, time delays, peak demand, or product defects. Deep collaboration 
across sub-units needs robust methods to design, evaluate, and verify data gathering and 
data feedback. Unlike economic models of transaction costs, or contractual relations, 
lean production emphasizes symmetrical collaboration to optimize outcome effective-
ness for the total eco-system organization, not sub-optimize for only certain members, 
sub-units, or component firms. Toyota’s collective identity is a notable corporate example 
that combines both superb operational performance but also long-term, forward looking 
innovation through its complex ecosystem of Tier I and Tier II supplier system. As 
depicted in Figure 3, Toyota aligns its supply system both domestically and overseas with 
knowledge systems, including standards of precision and quality, including using inter-
nal staffing and consultants to assure optimum outcomes against agreed benchmarks.
By replacing asymmetric contractual relations based on cost, Toyota shifts the 
locus of corporate risk to the total eco-system, involving Toyota at the center, the 
Tier I and Tier II suppliers, and their Tier I and Tier II suppliers. The lean “pull” of 
production control is a connectivity to calibrate inventory at each stage, starting 
with the final assembly and preceding to each preceding stage without delay. Unlike 
the push model, where the early steps of sub-assembly is sequential to subsequent 
stages and require buffer inventory to lesson delays, Toyota’s lean system of ‘pulling’ 
requires training and upgrading skills employed at different work stations, and close 
3 In mass assembly industries like autos, shipbuilding, and heavy construction equipment, where steel is 
a complementary component, scale, technology, and technical systems, including plant location, largely 
define cost advantages. By the early 1980s, the competitive gap between Japan and the US was increasing, 
just as Japanese firms were shifting from export strategies to direct foreign investment, i.e. establishing 
new plants in North America with the newest equipment, sourcing, and lean production. One analysis 
showed the contrast: “… the American steel industry had fallen from the largest and most technologically 
advanced in the world to the condition of a lagging competitor … companies retrofitted new technology 
unto often antiquated facilities” ([49], p. 91).
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communications across the total supply chain system. To make this system work, 
economic transaction costs are discarded, and replaced by a currency of cooperation 
using preventive tools and benchmarks to meet high standards of reliability where 
Tier II firms meet rigorous standards of price, quality, and delivery. Suppliers are 
battle-tested, i.e., they must conform to agreed specifications and their products 
are accepted only after years of testing. Tier I suppliers, on the other hand, meet the 
exacting standards of Tier II suppliers but they form part of the design, research, and 
testing of new products, markets, and technological innovations. Tier II suppliers 
can “graduate” to being Tier I suppliers if they meet benchmark performance over 
time, thus demanding intense deep collaboration at Level 4 (Figure 4).
Less coordinated systems of structure, processes, and executive decision-mak-
ing inhibit eco-system operability. Three integrating systems are vital: (1) technical 
systems, including IT, software, and data; (2) organizational tools of coordination, 
like dedication teams supported by specialists and intense data sharing; and (3) 
collaborative executive decision processes that champion novelty, innovation, and 
feedback [65, 66]. Inoperability can come from seemingly mundane tasks, like 
loading supplies on a truck with different invoices, manifest requirements, and 
Figure 4. 
Levels of Value Chain Collaboration: Toyota as Level 4.
Figure 3. 
Toyota’s Knowledge Diffusion and Sharing Approaches.
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delivery times. Separate and differing organizational processes inhibit deep collabo-
ration. Inoperability arises from silo information flows and compartmentalization. 
Even with aspirational targets of decision-making, organizations acting alone fail 
to develop and improve competencies and capabilities to manage this integrated 
system via experiential learning, feedback, and criticism [67–69].
Deep collaboration needs robust methods to design, evaluate, and verify data 
gathering and data feedback to optimize effectiveness for the total eco-system 
organization, not sub-optimize for only certain members, sub-parts, or component 
firms [70]. Toyota’s lean production now has both a language and a vocabulary to 
remove task ambiguities and increase identity among workers, sub-units, and facto-
ries in the global network, but requiring a learning process to perfect clear mean-
ings and defined protocols. Words like kanban, andon, jioda, yo-i-dan, and kijosei 
have precise meanings and routines, and such terms as reverse engineering, early 
detection, and ringi seido or consensus decision-making, simplify and codify precise 
protocols for shared communication. Benchmark techniques are widely used but 
less to evaluate past performance against competitors, but more to evaluate current 
performance against higher targets and aspirational stretch goals [71]. Indeed, deep 
collaboration at each stage requires a judicious combination of sharing ideas, new  
targets, real time feedback, and potential revisions. Where ambiguous signals, 
informal targets and past measures become explicit, and shared across the system.
Training programs—internships, formal courses, apprenticeships—build 
organizational capabilities and mitigates risks from operating with incomplete 
knowledge, inexperience, understanding operating rules and procedures. Deep 
collaboration illustrates the need for similar training approaches to know, under-
stand, and apply knowledge across the entire system. Toyota gains three network 
advantages: positional, where individual managers and subsidiaries access tools 
and protocols for high performance processes and benchmarks that create learning; 
structural, where communication connections strengthen the effectiveness and acu-
ity of information flows to attend to emerging problems; agility, by strengthening 
interactions between individuals and teams, and embedding the new benchmarks 
across the entire network of factories, sales offices, and supplier organizations.
7. Split identities at Toyota
By the early 1980s, Toyota, like many leading Japanese corporations such as 
Sony, Komatsu, Canon, Matsushita, and Hitachi, were making deep inroads in 
the American market via exports. The auto sector was singled out, as 500,000 
American autoworkers were laid off, a new President, Ronald Reagan faced pres-
sure from Congress to take legislative action, and firms like Ford applied to the 
American International Trade Commission for temporary relief, following similar 
action by the powerful auto union, the UAW. Further, Japan’s emphasis on direct 
export sales stood in contrast to American strategies of direct investment in foreign 
markets, often by acquisition of local companies [8, 45, 72] .4 For firms like Toyota, 
4 In one of the great ironies of business history, in the 1930s, when Ford and General Motors provided 
two-thirds of the Japanese car market, mostly by assembling kits from their home market, the Japanese 
government, despite their desire to focus on auto production, wanted Ford to establish a joint-venture 
with Toyota. Various agreements were planned, including land purchase, but Ford, denied permission 
to expand local production on its own, retreated from Japan in 1939, followed by GM [73]. In 1980, 
China invited Toyota to establish a joint venture, but when Toyota decided not to accept, China turned to 
Volkswagen, not by far the most successful foreign carmaker, producing 4 million units, in a market of 2 
million a month. Toyota produces only 1 million per year.
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growing high dependence on exports meant that larger total volumes (domestic + 
exports) strengthened their product capacity and cost position at home, including 
that of their supplier base. Japan’s auto exports to the US reached 6.6 million vehicles 
in 1981, up from a million units 10 years earlier, 566,042, accounted for almost 20% 
of total Japanese auto exports.
The imposition of Japan’s export restraints, formalized in June 1981, coin-
cided a $1.5b loan guarantee to Chrysler, indefinite layoffs of over 30,000 
auto workers, and sectors like steel facing declining market share. Pressed by 
firms like Ford for Congressional actions, MITI imposed export quotas on each 
Japanese company, a form of “administrative guidance” designed to accom-
modate political goals in each country but was in fact a “cartel” solution aimed 
to appease the US government [3, 74]. The percentage breakdown for each of the 
five biggest exporters, calculated mainly by US exports in the previous 2 years, 
was as follows: Toyota (30.75), Nissan (27.15), Honda (20.75), Mazda (9.48), 
and Mitsubishi (6.7). The impact for each company in the brutally competitive 
Japanese market varied: Honda was the first to begin direct investment, opening 
its first plant in Ohio and then Ontario; while Toyota kept to its quota by exports 
but strengthened domestic operations to build up a commanding market share 
lead, over 50%. For the Japanese auto sector, as Summerville notes [74], “invest-
ment in local production was also a crucial way to insulate oneself from further 
export cutbacks, and of course to get away from the thumb of the Japanese state” 
(p. 395). Toyota illustrates the complexity to manage very fast growth in foreign 
markets, while transferring its corporate identity to a network identity of safety, 
quality, and value [43], even though the knowledge sharing processes that are 
now taken for granted at home, including quality standards of suppliers, may not 
exist in foreign countries [75–78].
The massive recall in 1999, where Toyota accepted responsibility to service 
over 8.5 million vehicles, the President appearing before Congress, and sundry 
lawsuits launched in a litigious environment against a foreign-owned firm, 
have been analyzed and studied5 in the media, the automotive press, and by 
academic studies, with mixed conclusions. The reality, despite paying fines, 
accepting responsibility, apologizing to the American public, and accepting 
the huge financial costs of the recall, Toyota refused to play the blame game, or 
take easy solutions, like importing more parts from Canada or Japan, or shifting 
American production to Canada or Mexico. Toyota took the difficult decision, 
true to its identity, of fixing the core problem, raising the quality standards of its 
American-own parts supplier, devoting more resources to training, and accepting 
short-term risks to financial performance, particularly when leading automakers 
from Europe, Korea, and Japan were investing in the US market. The Detroit Big 
3 received temporary relief, a massive bailout after bankruptcy from the US and 
Canadian government, and a 25% tariff on imported trucks, one of the most prof-
itable segments for American producers. Toyota quietly responded about building 
a truck factory in Texas.
8. Discussion and conclusions
In a world of disruptive corporate strategy and identity offer a refined 
tool for alignment of stakeholders to create competitive advantage. Corporate 
culture focuses on the behavioral assumptions to perceive, think, and feel in 
5 For background, see Andrews et al. [79], Camuffo and Wilhelm [39], and Cole [80].
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problem-solving [81] within the organization, while organizational identity is 
a projection of that culture to external stakeholders to align both cognitive and 
behavioral tools for growth and innovation. Individual and sub-unit identities can 
lead to cleavage and discord, especially where environmental forces make knowl-
edge and information asymmetric, so special attention and sense-making requires 
an adaptive alignment to improve performance (Figure 5).
Increasing, all organizations face four separate but related challenges that impact 
overall performance but also survival as independent entities. Clearly, technological 
change imposes new challenges for internal organizational competences and capa-
bilities, as firms scramble for mergers, takeovers, and new alliances to meet the test 
of size and foreign market penetration, or a retreat approach or even drift. Decision 
uncertainty influences the nature of internal competencies, learning barriers, and 
the sustainable position of existing firms. The third challenge with disruption is 
the growing complexity of the firm’s ecosystem, and what is the optimal scale of a 
firm’s future business case, based on potential changes to customer markets across 
multiple countries?
The fourth challenge relates to the first three but is subtler. That challenge 
concerns what might be called the Galapagos trap, namely designing an ecosystem 
that is suitable for one market that is unsuitable for global markets and allows little 
transfer of knowledge or engineering knowhow to other markets with a separate 
eco-system, including the supplier system. Recent examples include Japan’s unique 
wireless standards that did not apply in foreign markets systems, or American big 
car gas guzzlers with limited fuel mileage that did not meet foreign market regula-
tions. Toyota’s development of hydrogen fuel powered vehicles, based on new 
chemical technologies, is a case in point, where existing infrastructure lacks the 
necessary technical requirements for even limited mass appeal. In all four of these 
development challenges, the competitive race is to avoid the lessons of the computer 
industry, where new smart phone technologies displaced existing incumbents, 
lowered entry barriers for new startups, and shifted the main suppliers and their 
location.
Such fundamental changes pose difficult questions for firms’ missions, cor-
porate identity, and framing long term employee loyalty. As Simon [76] warned 
decades ago, “organizational identification…implies absorption of strategic plans 
into the minds of organizational members where they can have direct effect upon 
the entire decision-process, starting with the identification of problems…” (p. 141).
Figure 5. 
Organizational Strategy and Identity Linkages.
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